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Chapter 11
Pragmatic Philosophy and the Social Function 
of Knowledge
Tilman Reitz
Even the members of the scientific community still do not know what it means to 
live in a “knowledge” society. Recent discussions of the issue are pervaded by a 
tension that is rarely noticed, for its aspects are situated within different academic 
disciplines. The social sciences mostly lack a well-considered definition of knowl-
edge, whereas philosophical debates about such a definition usually fail to discuss 
the social constitution of knowledge. The following contribution presents an analy-
sis of this problem, outlines a solution, and points out some of its implications.
Useful inspiration is found in pragmatic philosophy and in the efforts of social 
epistemology. Yet I argue that both of these approaches, too, overlook or repress a 
theoretical challenge: the spatial dispersion of social knowledge, which has been 
important since the invention of writing and storage media but which is pivotal in 
global networks of information. If knowledge is seated not only in the minds of 
individuals but also in the ways in which they collectively and collaboratively map 
their world, then it also matters where that knowledge is kept and how access to it is 
organized. The library thus serves as a paradigm of my account. The definition that 
will be developed permits inclusion of material resources and places in understand-
ings of knowledge, and it can be noted at the outset that the very term social episte-
mology was coined in library studies (Shera, 1970).
I proceed in four steps. First, I illustrate the problematic tension of sociological 
characterizations and philosophical definitions of knowledge. The second step 
develops an alternative to dominant philosophical discussions of the issue. The 
intention is to arrive at a definition that allows one to conceive of knowledge as a 
complex of social practices and cultural artifacts. In the third step, I compare this 
approach to results of social epistemology and identify the problem of space. Lastly, 
I place my account in the context of reflections about the knowledge society.
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 How to Define and How to Obscure Knowledge
One may question whether sociological or economic accounts of the knowledge 
society need to define knowledge. As soon as they do, however, quite different 
views surface. The best examples (also in the sense of solid, not simply deficient 
considerations) are found in the classical theories on the topic. Drucker (1969), 
probably the first writer to offer a conception of the knowledge society, was brief in 
definitional matters. Using an approach that has since become widespread (outside 
philosophy), he also made a specific point: “Knowledge, that is, the systematic 
organization of information and concepts,… makes apprenticeship obsolete. 
Knowledge substitutes systematic learning for exposure to experience” (p. 268). In 
context, Drucker focused even more on issues of application: Knowledge is ana-
lyzed as crucial in increasing the productivity of labor.
Four years later, Bell (1973) highlighted the opposite side when he noted a “new 
centrality of theoretical knowledge, the primacy of theory over empiricism” (p. 343, 
his italics). Accordingly, basic science is the main reference when he defines knowl-
edge as “a set of organized statements of facts or ideas, presenting a reasoned judg-
ment or an experimental result, which is transmitted to others through some 
communication medium in some systematic form” (p. 175). This definition has 
remained popular in descriptions of the recent, computer-based take-off of the 
knowledge society (see Castells, 1996, p. 17, for example). But the focus on explicit 
statements cannot account for a central novelty that characterizes the work of con-
temporary knowledge workers or symbol analysts (Reich, 1991)—the importance 
of situated problem-solving, which demands capacities of embodied or organiza-
tional knowledge. Such a capacity is probably at stake when Willke (1998) tries to 
define knowledge in structures where it matters “not as truth but as a resource” 
(p. 161): “Whereas information designates systemically relevant differences, knowl-
edge originates when such information is embedded in contexts of experience” 
(pp. 161–162, my translation).1 Unlike the standardized situations Drucker had in 
mind, this experience presumably affords more than textbooks can convey.
Historical differences set aside, the given examples seem to offer three system-
atically distinguishable accounts of knowledge:
 1. Knowledge as a systematic set of applicable recipes
 2. Knowledge as an organized body of theoretical statements
 3. Knowledge as a developed capacity of situated problem-solving
These accounts do not necessarily constitute or presuppose different concepts of 
knowledge. Maybe they are really only about different contexts in which knowledge 
matters and thus give different perspectives on the same thing. But if there should 
1 “Während Informationen systemspezifisch relevante Unterschiede bezeichnen, entsteht Wissen, 
wenn solche Informationen in bestimmte Erfahrungskontexte eingebunden sind.” (Willke, 1998, 
pp. 161–162). An interesting question would be whether strict social systems theory is really com-
patible with the strong accent on experience, particularly that of the individual.
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be an underlying concept of knowledge, it would be helpful to have a definition 
making it explicit.
The preceding quotations also hint at a strong option: They all identify knowl-
edge as information that is relatively organized and that can thus orient perception 
and action. If one adds the concept of data to that approach, a clear structural picture 
emerges:
Data is considered as a coded resource of operations, it is transformed into information 
when it is integrated into a relevant context where it makes a difference as a difference, it 
gains relevance and meaning relative to an integrating system. Information is transformed 
into knowledge when it is integrated into a context of experience. (Fuchs, 2004, par. 11).2
Such a model leaves open different possibilities of how information is organized 
and which kind of context is relevant. Following written instructions fits, as does 
employing individual mind maps in complex social constellations. Of course, both 
the definition of information and the notion of a context of experience call for fur-
ther explication. As far as necessary, it is given below. But two more principal prob-
lems should be tackled first. On the one hand, the redundancy of organizing data 
into information and organizing information into knowledge gives pause. Is it really 
necessary to draw two distinctions of the same kind? If knowledge should not mean 
only very dense information (processed in human culture), one needs to spell out the 
specific ways in which it is organized and becomes operative. On the other hand, 
distinguishing knowledge from information may involve more than specifying a 
context. Semantically, knowledge is characterized by strong cognitive optimism—
or by the kind of relation to truth that authors like Willke try to dismiss. Although 
information may be insufficient or misleading, knowledge is supposed to be about 
what is really the case. If someone says that you know and not only reasonably 
believe something (e.g., about natural laws, financial markets, the name of a coun-
try’s president), she or he means you are right. I try to show how this peculiar trait 
matters in social analysis. But first and more basically, the question is what it means 
for the definition of knowledge.
At this juncture one naturally turns to philosophy. I leave aside some interesting 
knowledge philosophies of the past, namely, of knowledge as systematic self- 
reflection of a culture (Hegel) or as an elucidation of our being-in-the-world 
(Heidegger). I also refrain from concentrating on the special case of scientific 
knowledge and the philosophy of science. Instead, I consider contemporary debates 
about knowledge in general, discourses in which reduced ontological claims, pre-
cise definitions, and aims of wide conceptual extension are to be expected. Sadly, 
most of these debates turn out to be almost literally footnotes to Plato and not even 
based on a precise reading of the text. As a result of this discussion, the need for a 
fresh pragmatic account will become discernible.
2 Fuchs (2004) does not quite agree with the structural outline (which he ascribes to authors such 
as Willke instead)—but only because his own project is a general theory for “all self-organizing 
physical, biological, and social systems” (par. 11). According to Fuchs, attention must thus be 
drawn to restrictions: “[T]he triad is not data-information-knowledge, but data-knowledge-practi-
cal knowledge as a manifestation of information in the human realm” (par. 11).
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Where contemporary philosophers turn to defining knowledge, they almost inev-
itably start with the classic paradigm: justified true belief. The passages in Plato 
suggesting this definition of knowledge are found in the dialogues Meno (trans. 
1990) and Theatetus (trans. 1996). In both dialogues, the term epistéme (knowledge 
or even science) is defined in similar ways:
• as metà lógou alethés doxa, true belief/opinion with reasoning/explanation 
(Theatetus, 201c) and
• as orthé or alethés dóxa, correct or true belief/opinion, together with aitías 
logismós, an account of the reason/origin (Meno, 97b–98a).
In one of the dialogues, the proposed definition fails; in the other it is accepted. 
What is of interest here is only what can be made of them (which actually involves 
one additional reference to the argument of Meno). Contemporary debates show 
that, for example, a narrow Cartesian interpretation is possible. Various authors 
accentuate that only individuals can believe and thus know something, and some 
commentators even take the degree of belief as decisive: Whoever is not certain is 
no candidate for knowing. I call this stance Cartesian because it makes individual 
consciousness central. Other scholars, such as the British philosopher Edward Craig 
(1990), have argued that belief does not matter at all (pp. 12–17) or have developed 
notions of group knowledge and belief (see below, section on Social Epistemology 
and Spatial Difference). The whole range of positions, however, leaves the structure 
of the Platonic definition remarkably untouched. This lack of conceptual innovation 
is even clearer from the fact that most discussions have focused on the meaning of 
justified or on the question in which sense reasons turn true belief into knowledge. 
A glimpse of these debates is useful to gain a sense of where the discussion got 
stuck.
The main idea of asking what justified means can serve as a starting point: What 
if I entertain a belief that is both justified and true, but only accidentally so? 
Examples and thought experiments relating to this question abound.3 A simple one 
should be sufficient for my purposes in this chapter. Suppose, for instance, that I 
reasonably believe the refrigerator contains something to drink because I put orange 
juice in. And suppose that there actually is something to drink in there—but not the 
juice I am thinking about, for someone took it out and replaced it with milk without 
my realizing it. It would thereby not seem correct to say that I know the true state of 
affairs. Different solutions have been proposed, among them creative ones such as 
recurring to intellectual virtues (which, as virtues, imply success).4 The general pat-
tern may be derived from the initial question about the role of justification: Justified 
true belief that is not just contingently true.
Yet this extended definition is not the only possible solution. Goldman (1999), a 
main proponent of social epistemology, proposed distinguishing between different 
3 A major part of the debate refers to a short text by Gettier (1963), after whom the said thought 
experiments are named Gettier-style cases.
4 A resulting definition reads: “Knowledge is a state of (true) belief arising out of acts of intellec-
tual virtue” (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 271).
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kinds or degrees of knowledge instead. In cases of “weak knowledge” (p. 23), true 
belief alone is sufficient. Reasons hardly matter when I ask, “Who in this room 
knows the capital of Cambodia?” But there are also cases where one insists on hav-
ing “strong knowledge,” which then has to be qualified by “some additional element 
or elements” (p. 23) “such as justification or warrant for the belief, and the exclusion 
of alternative possibilities” (p. 23). Goldman even develops a third model of quasi- 
infallible, “super-strong knowledge” (p. 23), but he does so mainly to show that 
there is little or no practical need for such a concept. This argument about context is 
also what I take to be the message of his account: It is necessary to ask which under-
standing of knowledge makes sense in what kind of everyday circumstances.
Following this line, a general critique of the debates in question can be mounted. 
It is certainly laudable that contemporary philosophers start with everyday language 
and intuitions when they discuss components and definitions of knowledge. But it is 
not sure that these sources are differentiated enough to pin down the true and exact 
meaning of a notion that signifies diverse and complex practices. Moreover, the 
usual approach focuses only on a very small segment of the various ways in which 
people actually talk about knowing and knowledge. An aspect that will turn out to 
be crucial is that analytic philosophers almost invariably explicate the verb to know 
when they want to find out something about the noun knowledge. In a classical 
study, for instance, Chisholm (1989) proposed the following “definition of knowl-
edge” (p. 98): “h is known by S = Def (1) h is true; (2) S accepts h; (3) h is evident 
for S” (followed by an unnecessarily complicated fourth clause) (p. 98).
Unlike such definitions, everyday language seems to distinguish between verb 
and noun in important respects. Whereas knowing is exclusively attributed to per-
sons (or, controversially, to quasi subjects like groups or clever animals), knowledge 
may also be situated in objective media or structures and transpersonal organiza-
tions. I do not really claim that my computer knows what I wrote during the last few 
years (even if it has it all stored), but no formal reason keeps me from saying that 
the knowledge of the National Security Agency (NSA) is frighteningly extensive, 
that the library of Alexandria housed most of the knowledge of classical antiquity, 
or that Wikipedia increasingly encompasses the basic common knowledge of the 
present world.
Such uses of language do not already imply an alternative definition of knowl-
edge. They are as useful and potentially misleading as uses of to know are. But if 
there is no sensible way to decide where to start, it is appropriate to adopt an alterna-
tive strategy of using common language and practice to derive and test definitions. 
Instead of determining without ambiguity what is meant by one specific way to talk 
about knowledge and knowing—or, worse, intuitions about both—it would be 
instructive to ask which set of practices and capacities people typically refer to when 
applying these notions. Marginal cases such as group convictions and tacit or 
implicit knowledge may remain problematic then, but much is gained when they 
can at least be related to a core understanding.
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 Knowledge as Practice: Keeping Information Available
A new approach is thus not only desirable but apparent as soon as one specifies how 
a pragmatic philosophy of knowledge should proceed. It should not simply identify 
as true what proves useful (although a notion of use will indeed be important). It 
should ask how people act in contexts in which the concept of knowledge makes 
sense. The strategy just outlined has already been employed by Craig (1990), who 
introduced an additional reflection to make his point: What is called knowledge can 
be best constructed in contrast to a sociocognitive state of nature without or before 
it.
If what I shall say is along the right lines, the core concept of knowledge is an outcome of 
certain very general facts about the human situation; so general, indeed, that one cannot 
imagine their changing whilst anything we can still recognise as social life persists. Given 
those facts, and a modicum of self-awareness, the concept will appear; and for the same 
reasons as caused it to appear, it will then stay (p. 10).
I do not try to be equally transhistorical. But I do subscribe to Craig’s project to 
develop a “prototypical case” (p. 15) or a social core situation of knowledge use by 
spelling out what one could not do without it.
I am less satisfied with his answer. Craig (1990) constructs only a very basic 
original situation of knowledge, and he actively refuses to introduce necessary 
extensions. The basic problem he refers to is that reliable information is needed 
from someone else. It is this other person, not some presocial believer, to whom 
knowledge is typically (and prototypically) ascribed. This construction has two 
components. The first is unproblematic, but not sufficient: “To put it briefly and 
roughly, the concept of knowledge is used to flag approved sources of information” 
(p. 10). What is missing is, again, a specific way to distinguish knowledge from 
mere information, however approved its sources may be. Craig’s way of solving the 
problem brings in the second component: Although there are many possible sources 
of information, only personal informants are said to have and convey knowledge. 
Once again, the verb to know is employed to make the distinction plausible, but 
Craig’s text also includes a substantial pragmatic argument: Natural sources of 
information and even cultural artifacts cannot cooperate with the seeker of informa-
tion; other members of her or his epistemic community can. The idea is most inter-
estingly illustrated by books. Craig explains both why he does not want to attribute 
knowledge in this case and why some notion of knowledge still seems appropriate:
Books and the like [are] excellent sources of information, but never, even in the spirit of 
metaphor, said to know anything…Not that specialist knowledge of any kind is required to 
unravel their secrets—a large part of their point is to provide a perspicuous source, acces-
sible to anyone with a command of the language they use. But they have none of the psy-
chology of the prototypical informant: they have no beliefs, they do not act, they are not felt 
to co-operate with us, and they cannot empathise with us so as to anticipate our purposes. 
Besides, they have a special place amongst the sources of information: they are the evidence 
laid down by creatures that are prototypical informants precisely as the most perspicuous 
vehicle of their information. (p. 38)
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This description is fine, but Craig (1990) seems to overlook an obvious conse-
quence—the human practice of knowledge may require both personal informants 
and storage media like books. The result is that Craig’s prototype adds nothing 
substantial to the preconception of knowledge that has already emerged in social 
science accounts. He, too, could have defined knowledge as information (processed 
in human culture), and he may not even be able to give a satisfying account of cul-
ture. At root, an even vaguer summary seems adequate: “The human form of life 
demands good information, and the reliable flow of information. The concept of 
knowledge, along with related concepts, serves those needs” (Greco, 2009, p. 320).
This summary includes a minor mistake but it hints at a basic problem. Craig 
probably did not mix up the concept of knowledge with the practical structures it 
designates, but his account seems to lack important practical distinctions. In order 
to see what is lacking, one only has to ask whether the word flow applies equally 
well to both knowledge and information. As far as I see, both have different practi-
cal characteristics in this respect. Whereas information is typically transferred (and 
received as something new), knowledge is usually kept available over time. For 
example, one speaks of a flow of information when talking about communication 
technology but says that knowledge is kept in books and assembled in libraries. 
Even the information age could produce the sentence, “I store my knowledge in my 
friends.” It goes without saying that these formulations may all only be manners of 
speaking and that society has also developed huge infrastructures for storing poten-
tial information or data. But the idea that it is an essential feature of knowledge to 
be kept available for future use is consistent with many other characteristics dis-
cussed so far in this chapter: its higher degree of organization, its versatile employ-
ability, even the semantic connection between knowledge and truth. Above all, I 
think this idea gives a specific answer to Craig’s question of why there is occasion 
to apply the concept knowledge. It is because there are established practices of 
keeping correct beliefs or information available over time so that people can ask 
informants, use cultural sources of information, or just resort to their own mne-
monic capacities when necessary.
Before I try and condense these initial reflections into a definition, I would like 
to offer my own footnote to Plato, who expressed similar intuitions about knowl-
edge. When in Meno the question is asked what makes knowledge more valuable 
than mere true opinion, the answer is that it will not run away; reasons are ties that 
keep it fixed in the soul (Meno, 98a). One of Plato’s own examples helps show how 
this image relates to the proposed account. If someone just happens to have a true 
opinion about the way to Larissa, she can give me the right information. But if that 
person really knows about it (or, even better, about the location of the city), she will 
be a steady, reliable informant in this respect. This interlocutor will, for instance, 
first check whether the place from which I set out is near Athens or near Thessaloniki, 
then think about roads going northwards or southwards from there, and so on. My 
informant may, in non-Platonic spirit, even use a map in order to refresh her knowl-
edge or, as one might also say, have recourse to the cultural knowledge laid down in 
maps and the like.
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Which definition can be drawn from this account? First, one needs basic ele-
ments such as the correct, useful opinions, beliefs, statements, or indications that 
figure in the given examples. As most examined contemporary theories suggest, 
information is an adequate term for grasping their common core. In other words, the 
material of knowledge consists of transferrable patterns that enable one to tell some-
thing about something in the world or that make a difference for operations of 
diverse systems in a changing environment. These patterns may be sentences 
explaining a travel route, a bee dance giving directions for collecting pollen, or even 
substances transmitting signals in an organism. The more exclusively human char-
acter of knowledge originates, second, when such information is assembled, inte-
grated into a given framework, fixated, and stored for future use (practical or 
epistemic). None of these operations is redundant, but for the sake of brevity, inte-
gration into frameworks and fixation can be taken as implied in the exercise of 
assembly and structured storage. Most important, all operations are part of one pro-
cess. They interact in the way information is organized, or reorganized, as a perma-
nently available structure of orientation. Many versions of this interaction are 
conceivable. Assembling often includes generalizing and subsuming. Both opera-
tions usually occur within established logical or topical hierarchies. Fixation, too, 
involves ordering and aims at facilitating accessibility. Only where such organiza-
tion takes place do books, experts, and universities, and not merely repositories or 
hard drives, have a role to play. Together, these considerations are sufficient for 
venturing a definition of knowledge:
Knowledge is information in the condition of being assembled and kept available 
for future use.
As a definition offered in pragmatic spirit, this formulation is open to empirical 
specification and maybe even substantial amendment. I immediately note the main 
variable aspects, indicating where I take them to be strengths and where I think 
additional reflection is needed.
 1. The most obvious and voluntary openness of the proposed definition is that it 
does not specify media of knowledge. Information may be assembled and kept 
available in the minds of people, in cultural artifacts, and in social organizations. 
One can even argue that artifacts and social cooperation are a necessary part of 
the knowledge process, for people generally keep information available through 
symbols. (The person who knows that she put something in the fridge thus turns 
out to be a weak case, comparable to a squirrel that “knows” where it put the 
hazelnut.) This openness about media gives space for research on knowledge 
structures in the social sciences and humanities. The only restriction is that the 
practice of knowledge implies potential users of information.
 2. What is also left open is the way in which information is actually organized, or 
how assembling, fixating, and keeping available work together. Maybe further 
reflection could carve out a clear functional scheme in this regard (e.g., a scheme 
oriented to the telos of availability), but I rather think that there are culturally and 
historically varying possibilities. One paradigmatic context where the concrete 
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organization of permanently available information can be studied is, obviously, 
the institution of science.
 3. A less visible openness is implied in the perspective from which the definitional 
terms are chosen. As the notion of information exemplifies, they should work 
from the inside perspective of cultural participants as well as from an external 
focus on observable operations and causal relationships. The terms assemble, 
keep available, and use certainly have a participant bias—but they are nearly 
neutral, allowing for phenomenological, hermeneutic, semantic, and objectivist 
specification.
 4. Finally, the definition does not systematically include the idea that a language 
community takes knowledge per se to be true. It only suggests why people do so: 
Information that is kept available for future use is deemed worthy of being kept. 
What counts as knowledge, not just as guess, opinion, belief, or conviction in 
intersubjective settings is understandably a stock of preserved, cultivated, 
proven, and tested insights and orientations.5 Whether we—individuals, groups, 
cultures—are right to rely on it is a different question. In some cases we have 
very reliable clues, sometimes whole cultures turn out to be wrong. Any further 
inquiry would also have to see whether it is really the same kind of reliance in 
which they may be wrong. Perhaps the key words episteme, scientia, and knowl-
edge, or even knowledge, savoir, and Wissen, do not designate the same thing.
The last reflection deserves further comment; it brings up problems of relativism. 
To avoid them, one could add that the information kept available for future use has 
to be correct, or reliable, or even organized as a true account of reality. Yet this cri-
terion would force strong presuppositions into a mere definition. I prefer to leave 
even this consideration open by referring to the different possible views indicated in 
point 2, above. A deeper analysis from the participant perspective would have to 
make sense of several conflicting facts: that people cease to treat beliefs and state-
ments as knowledge when they prove to be untrue, whereas people also know they 
risk error when they state or believe anything at all; that they disagree with the truth 
procedures of other cultures and times and yet would not deny that those cultures 
had knowledge; and so forth. Solutions may be either relativistic or objectivistic. 
For research in which the observer perspective predominates, however, it is suffi-
cient to know what counts and functions as knowledge (or something very similar) 
in different sociocultural contexts. Researchers in social science (and epistemology) 
cannot avoid coming back to their own life world, but they do not need to become 
mired in efforts to make it transparent. Moreover, only reaching beyond the horizon 
of one’s inherited language and practices may show just how much relativism is 
possible.
The proposed conceptual philosophical reflection thus allows me to come back 
to issues of sociocultural enquiry. This is precisely the desired effect. Yet the 
5 A stronger formulation would be that information is filtered before it is kept: “Knowledge…is the 
consequence of a filtering process; the process of filtering…facts through the ethical system or the 
intellectual system, or the system of scholarship…of the individual who receives it” (Shera, 1970, 
p. 96).
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 question remains whether a modestly innovative, pragmatic, philosophical defini-
tion of knowledge changes anything for the empirical disciplines.
 Social Epistemology and Spatial Difference
Another theoretical detour will help find answers. Proponents of social epistemol-
ogy have worked out an account that fits well with the purpose of the proposed defi-
nition. They, too, wish to avoid restricting the attribution of knowledge to individuals. 
Instead, they situate knowledge in collectives and organizations. In doing so, they 
offer instruments that may help analyze the changing social composition of knowl-
edge and to advance from definitions of the concept to a discussion of concrete 
conceptions. I introduce three innovations of this sort and discuss their perspectives 
and limits. As already indicated, the main problem that will show up is a lack of 
attention to the cultural media of knowledge and an ensuing space blindness—
against which more extensive sociodiagnostic opportunities will become apparent.
A difficult, but interesting, point of departure can be found in Gilbert (1994), 
who is generally concerned with shared intentionality. Specifically, she also assumes 
collective or group beliefs. According to her, such beliefs surface when a group 
member expresses a view to which the others presumably (and legitimately) show 
reactions of shocked surprise. All had agreed for a long while that John is an 
unpleasant type, and suddenly Maggie comes up with the remark, “How nice John 
was again yesterday!” A group of string-theory researchers sits down for lunch, 
when a member sighs, “What nonsense this whole string theory is!” Gilbert argues 
that appalled reactions such as “What did you just say?” are quite in order here. 
Long-standing agreement (in the first example) and shared practice (in the second 
example) have produced a kind of obligation not to utter the statements in question. 
Such obligations may be unpleasant themselves, but they are to some extent 
unavoidable and fulfill basic social functions:
Apart from the general function of providing individuals with a sense of unity or commu-
nity with others…, the collective beliefs evidently provide points from which people can go 
forward, not forever locked in the back and forth of argumentative conflict. (p. 253)
I momentarily refrain from evaluating this argument and step right ahead to a 
second, more refined account of collective intellectual organization. Whereas 
Gilbert’s (1994) model refers only to the most basic practice of knowledge, the 
preservation of belief, this second account is concerned with reasons or collective 
rationality. Pettit (2003) has argued that a genuinely collective combination of ele-
ments of reasoning can often yield better results than is possible with an aggregate 
of complete individual judgments. Judging indeed offers an instructive example. 
Take a legal committee that must decide whether someone is liable for having bro-
ken a contract and whose members separately consider whether there was a valid 
contract in place to begin with and whether a breach of contract has occurred. The 
result may be the following distribution of premises and conclusions (Table 11.1).
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In this case the majority of complete individual judgments or conclusions speaks 
against liability (1:2)—but the sum of premises or basic judgments says the oppo-
site (4:2 in favor of liability). So which stance is the more rational one: respecting 
the integral individual opinions or forming an integral collective judgment? Pettit 
(2003) suggests that comparable cases occur in various spheres of life and that in 
most cases people choose the strategy of “collectivizing reason” (p. 176). Moreover, 
if procedures and goals remain constant, collective agents emerge, and under Pettit’s 
premises it really seems rational to be obliged to follow their lead. The elements of 
collective reason, then, are not integral individual opinions but rather observations, 
arguments, and other information cut out of the context of their individual 
processing.
The model of collective rationality, of course, does not offer a complete concep-
tion of knowledge. It offers only material for rethinking aspects of knowledge prac-
tices (affecting the element justified in the standard definition or, in Shera’s (1970) 
terms, the process of filtering information; see footnote 5, above). Most important, 
it says little about how conclusions can be socially stabilized—Pettit (2003) only 
sketchily refers to the concept of the juridical person in Gierke’s (1990) 
Genossenschaftsrecht (law of fellowship). Hence, a third account that explicitly 
introduces the notion of collective knowledge is welcome. Goldman (2004) pro-
posed just such an account as an alternative to Pettit’s (2003) collective rationality. 
The new aspect is the organization of epistemic competencies and epistemic author-
ity. First, Goldman proposes to add that individual judgments may be differently 
weighed. (For instance, the opinion of an experienced doctor counts more than that 
of an apprentice.) As far as I see, this addition is compatible with (maybe even 
envisaged by) Pettit. What is more interesting is a second nondemocratic consider-
ation, namely, whether an epistemic collective needs persons who are exclusively 
authorized to define its knowledge and draw consequences. In Goldman’s (2004) 
view, only such an authority structure can explain sentences such as, “We learned 
since 9/11 that not only did we not know what we didn’t know, but the F.B.I. didn’t 
know what it did know” (p. 12).
How is it possible that the same entity, in this instance the U.S. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, knew something and did not know it? Goldman’s (2004) answer is 
that the organization’s authorities did not realize the threat, so the organization 
could not react: “[A]t least one Bureau official with appropriate decision-making 
authority had to receive messages from the various agents, had to believe those mes-
sages, and had to pool or amalgamate them into a larger pattern” (p. 19).
Table 11.1 Individual and collective rationality in a court decision
Judge Valid contract? Breach? Liability?
1 Yes Yes Yes
2 Yes No No
3 No Yes No
From Pettit (2003), p. 169
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That account may be adequate, but it confounds two different aspects: achieving 
knowledge and drawing practical consequences. On the one hand, one might simply 
ask whether knowledge of an imminent threat existed at all somewhere in the orga-
nization or even at the correct place. Such knowledge could have existed, for 
instance, because it would have been easy for people to combine alarming observa-
tions; because at least one agent, with or without authorization, actually brought 
together relevant pieces of information; or because a computerized system had 
switched over to flight-attack alert. On the other hand, this knowledge could have 
led decision-makers to draw consequences or not. In that case a fitting description 
would be that the FBI knew something but did not react. What remains of Goldman’s 
(2004) account is that epistemic organizations need nodal points where information 
is brought together and theoretical conclusions are arrived at. But these organiza-
tions need not be so hierarchical that the persons who know and those who decide 
are the same individuals.
Taken together, the three accounts of social epistemic structures present an inter-
esting range of possibilities. All may be translated into conceptions of knowledge, 
but into obviously one-sided ones. In Gilbert’s (1994) case, keeping information 
available would involve dull conformity pressure, or what Durkheim (1893/1933) 
called “mechanical solidarity” (pp. 71–110). In Goldman’s (2004) view, assembling 
information seems to be possible only in top echelons of a hierarchy. Even in Pettit’s 
(2003) democratic vision constant socioepistemic unity is tied to a narrow pattern, 
corporate law.
Hence, two very different conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the nature 
of knowledge heavily depends on its social organization. Whether a collective, a 
person, or a set of rules decides will affect various aspects like the complexity, gen-
erality or particularity, and expandability or closure of the information kept avail-
able. Luckily, real social knowledge is circulating between different organizations 
and is today also structured by other patterns of social order, such as systemic codes 
of communication. But the claustrophobic impression conveyed by the discussed 
paradigms of social epistemology may also be due to another factor, their neglect of 
the spatial and medial externality of fixated knowledge.
More precisely, the second possible conclusion about the effect of social epis-
temic structures has to do with the way in which information is stored for later use. 
Gilbert (1994), Pettit (2003), and Goldman (2004) all aim at a seat of epistemic 
unity (group belief or obligation, the juridical person, and decision-making author-
ity, respectively). However, information can be kept available for future use in spa-
tial dispersion as well. A corporation or intelligence agency may have stored its 
knowledge in experts and archives and on tapes and hard drives in various locations, 
and may still have relatively well-organized procedures of reporting and access. 
Even a group of researchers may confidently rely on past publications. Recognizing 
such reservoirs immediately reduces social pressure in most of the given examples. 
Gilbert’s string theorists could allow each other some free expressions of doubt at 
lunch time; Goldman’s chief officers could leave to others some of the knowledge- 
generating work and concentrate on making decisions under difficult circumstances. 
At the level of theory, the introduction of material infrastructures helps to avoid the 
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simplistic dichotomy of knowledge as a mere aggregation of individual views and 
the idea of a completely unified knowledge community.
Certainly, spatial dispersion also poses problems. In the given context they can 
be subsumed in a simple principle, capturing the flip side of relaxed social pressure: 
lack of social control. Sometimes reporting procedures fail, leaving the officers in 
charge little or no chance to bring the knowledge of their organization to bear. 
Sometimes the research group falls apart because different members draw different 
conclusions from collective publications. The resulting ambivalence could be a rea-
son why spatially dispersed knowledge is not very popular in epistemology. 
Proponents of anarchist epistemologies like Jacques Derrida are the main (and in 
philosophy almost the only) ones to show a special interest in this issue.6
Other theoretical accounts, however, would have reason to follow, for the spa-
tially enriched approach offers a range of systematic perspectives, not least an 
understanding of the way in which media- and communication-technology condi-
tions epochs of knowledge. It undeniably helps reconstruct traditional settings in 
which a whole geography of knowledge centers (from Athens to Paris) and places 
of assembly (archives, libraries, collections, and schools) had to be mastered and in 
which new mechanisms of dispersion (e.g., the printing press and an expanding lit-
erary market) brought about radical change. It can even be used to analyze structural 
changes of knowledge in an age of ever-improving communication and information 
technology, where the epistemic importance of spatial distance is allegedly in 
decline or at least changing its character. In this context new observations concern-
ing the density of socioepistemic control will also be possible.
 Delocalized and Resituated Knowledge in the Information Age
I offer a deliberately fragmentary outlook encompassing only two schematic obser-
vations pertinent to the proposed definition and the spatial structures of knowledge. 
Both show changes in the organization and dispersion of epistemic practices. I first 
introduce my observations, then explain and discuss each in turn:
 (a) As the physical location of knowledge loses importance, the social location of 
the agents and use of knowledge becomes increasingly relevant.
 (b) As the long-standing functional division between information and knowledge 
becomes partly challenged by information-processing machines, the sociophys-
ical location of stored data partly replaces the traditional geography of 
knowledge.
Part of assumption (a) is common sense today. An optimistic statement contain-
ing it is, “Today a child anywhere in the world who has Internet access has access 
6 An accessible version of Derrida’s (1996/1998) theory of spatially dispersed knowledge is the 
partly autobiographic essay on monolingualism, where he explained what it means to learn French 
culture in Algeria. For a systematic reconstruction of this theory, see Quadflieg (2007).
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to more knowledge than a child in the best schools of industrial countries did a 
quarter of a century ago” (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 318). This statement is true as far as 
access to textual sources of knowledge is concerned, and yet it sounds rather naïve. 
The reason is that Stiglitz is not speaking of the social and cognitive framework that 
helps one choose the right sources and make sense of them, nor does he mention 
possible contexts of use. Even if the child, by chance or by genius, finds the right 
track to develop sophisticated knowledge in genetic engineering, or investment 
banking, or the construction of microchips, she or he will still need other favorable 
conditions in order to put this knowledge to any use or even make money with it. 
The ensemble of such conditions—such as nationality, language background, travel 
opportunities, established contacts, educational credentials, and material means—is 
what I propose to call (with loose reference to Bourdieu, 1985) the social location 
of the knowledge protagonist. Of course, globalized access to knowledge sources 
will enable additional people to repair cars, build bombs, or engage in software 
programming, but in many cases the limits of their social location will replace the 
former effects of spatial distance.
Further reflection on the economic uses of knowledge shows that social location 
may even become more important than it has been in industrial capitalism. General 
knowledge that can be technically distributed at little more than zero cost is not well 
suited as a source of private wealth. Standard economic approaches show that treat-
ing it as a nonpublic good incurs general inefficiencies in both immediate consump-
tion and the chances of creating further knowledge (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz, 1999). 
Things look different, however, for the situated knowledge of experts. Tasks such as 
adapting software to a firm’s special needs, installing new microchips in a car mod-
el’s control system, finding the cheapest possible labor force where supply chains 
are still sufficient, and identifying the passages in U.S. patent law that keep com-
petitors off the market involve profitable expertise. As the examples suggest, such 
expertise can be needed either in productive settings or in settings marked by con-
flicting interests, to the benefit or detriment of general welfare. In both cases, it is 
the unique social situation of use that determines the structure of valuable knowl-
edge. In light of the previous discussion, this new impact of social location can also 
be seen as a factor that tightens social control. Instead of socially overdetermined 
spatial distances, mere social power relations now sort out who can successfully act 
as a knowledge agent.
At the same time, reduced generality, or increased sensitivity to individual 
capacities and specific situations, affect the concept of knowledge itself. The mar-
ginal case is that knowledge is reduced to intransparent expert reputation, or mere 
knowing how to do things at a certain (social) place.7 In rather unspecific and imper-
sonal settings, other reasons raise the question of whether knowledge is still appro-
priate as a name. As observation (b) suggests, the old practices of keeping 
information available for future use have been duplicated by a process not easily 
7 The examples of knowledge work discussed by Willke (1998), taken mainly from the sphere of 




called knowledge: storing encoded information or data for future operations. The 
relevant word here is operations, for encoded information is something that one can 
already find in charts, written calculations, and even books. What is new is that such 
information can be automatically processed without the intervention of human 
agents but with huge practical and epistemic effects. Examples are the instances 
when stock market programs buy and sell shares, police software identifies danger-
ous persons, and semantic tools browse scientific data bases.
The standard definition makes it simple to distinguish the information processed 
from knowledge in such cases. The operations in question involve neither beliefs 
nor truth and justification, or do so only in the period when programs are designed. 
Pragmatic definitions, too, offer a clear criterion of distinction in that use or context 
of experience imply that human agents participate in the process. Yet I think the 
more interesting point is that practices of knowledge are really pervaded by pro-
cesses that make it hard to draw boundaries. A semantic symptom is that the knowl-
edge economy and society have always been discussed in relation to mere 
information.8 That scope proves to be adequate. Human agency is only one of an 
increasing number of forces that keep information available and intervene in the 
world accordingly.
Goals and consequences are still a human and social affair. One of the most 
remarkable effects of the rise of information technology is that the geopolitical loca-
tion of data storage is gaining new relevance. Although knowledge is spreading ever 
more widely across the globe, the question of whose territory data are stored on 
plainly matters because the answer determines who will protect them or can compel 
access to them. In broad theoretical terms, the duality of social control and not com-
pletely controllable spatial dispersion must be complemented by a third dimension: 
struggles over the control of the spatial infrastructure of information. Such struggles 
have probably occurred ever since the first clay-tablet reports on crops were assem-
bled in capital cities, and they continue in the age of the transhuman information–
knowledge complex.
 Conclusion
Taken together, my sketchy concluding observations convey the thrust of the pro-
posed definition of knowledge. The intention is to achieve not only conceptual clar-
ity but a renewed empirical view and the chance to explore hitherto unseen 
connections. This aim can even entail risking the stability of the definition itself or 
restricting its historical extension. I have highlighted an obvious, but usually omit-
ted, basic function of knowledge in order to escape both restricted and unspecific 
8 The first paradigm was given by Machlup (1962), who simply refused to distinguish between 
knowledge and information (p. 8). Extensive studies of the “information economy” have followed 
(Porat & Rubin, 1977), and publications on the “information society” have abounded since the late 
1970s.
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uses of the concept. The risk stems from the fact that this very function—keeping 
information available for future use—is finding ever more near equivalents in the 
processing of information and the storing of data. In the course of the argument, 
however, it turned out that this hazard is not the only problem that keeps even social 
philosophers from leaving traditional epistemology. As soon as the spatial disper-
sion of knowledge looms, scholars still seem to shrink from addressing gaps in 
socioepistemic control and from recognizing power struggles that the mind cannot 
master.
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